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Several empirical studies have challenged tournament theory by pointing out that (1) there is 
considerable pay variation within hierarchy levels, (2) promotion premiums only in part 
explain hierarchical wage differences and (3) external recruitment is observable on nearly 
any hierarchy level. We explain these empirical puzzles by combining job-promotion 
tournaments with higher-level bonus payments in a two-tier hierarchy. Moreover, we show 
that under certain conditions the firm implements first-best effort on tier 2 although workers 
earn strictly positive rents. The reason is that the firm can use second-tier rents for creating 
incentives on tier 1. If workers are heterogeneous, the firm strictly improves the selection 
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Empirical literature on internal labor markets has documented stylized facts
that are not in line with traditional models. In particular, Baker, Gibbs and
Holmström (1994a, 1994b) and others1 have emphasized that three empiri-
cal puzzles question the traditional theory of job-promotion tournaments: (1)
there is considerable variation in pay on each hierarchy level, which contra-
dicts the important prerequisite of tournaments that wages must be attached
to jobs in order to generate incentives, (2) promotion premiums that are paid
to workers when moving to higher levels in the hierarchy can explain only
part of the hierarchical wage diﬀerences in ﬁrms, (3) we can observe external
recruiting on almost any hierarchy level in diverse ﬁrms from diﬀerent coun-
tries, which would erase incentives from internal job-promotion tournaments.
In our paper, we combine job-promotion tournaments with additional
incentive schemes to explain these empirical puzzles. We consider a two-
tier hierarchy where workers produce only ordinal performance information
on the ﬁrst level, but are individually visible after promotion to the second
level. Here, they become responsible for certain (managerial) tasks that
lead to individual and veriﬁable performance signals. The ﬁrm can use three
diﬀerent instruments to stimulate incentives. First, it can make use of relative
performance pay on the ﬁrst hierarchy level. Second, it can install a bonus
scheme on hierarchy level 2 based on individual performance. Finally, it can
combine both hierarchy levels by employing a job-promotion scheme that
assigns the better performing worker of level 1 to the next hierarchy level.
The adoption of such a promotion tournament implies that the prize for
superior ﬁrst-level performance is supplemented by expected rents from the
second-level incentive contract.
Our results show that in many situations the ﬁrm prefers to combine all
three incentive devices, thus explaining the three mentioned puzzles above:
since promoted workers receive diﬀerent bonuses depending on success and
failure, we have a natural variation in pay on the second hierarchy level, which
1See Lazear (1992), Ariga, Ohkusa and Brunello (1999), Seltzer and Merrett (2000),
Treble et al. (2001), Dohmen, Kriechel and Pfann (2004), Gibbs and Hendricks (2004)
and Grund (2005).
2explains puzzle (1). As a promoted worker earns both relative performance
pay and bonuses, hierarchical wage increases are only in part determined by
job promotion, hence explaining puzzle (2). In this context, one of the empir-
ical ﬁndings by Dohmen, Kriechel and Pfann (2004) is interesting. Contrary
to other ﬁrm studies, they are able to determine the exact point in time
when a worker realizes a pay increase, and they ﬁnd out that promotion and
wage increase are often not simultaneous. This observation ﬁts quite well to
our model that combines job-promotion with bonus pay. Finally, our model
points out that the combination of job-promotion tournament and bonus
pay has one crucial disadvantage — it restricts the set of implementable eﬀort
pairs for the two hierarchy levels as both levels are interlinked. We show that
sometimes the ﬁrm prefers external recruiting in order to partly get rid of
this problem, which explains empirical puzzle (3).
The aim of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, it addresses empirical
puzzles that cannot be explained by standard tournament models. In this
sense, it follows the advice of Waldman (forthcoming) to develop a more
sophisticated tournament model that is able to explain the empirical ﬁndings
by Baker, Gibbs and Holmström (1994a, 1994b), which contradict traditional
tournament models. On the other hand, we want to add to the theory of
rank-order tournaments2 by combining tournaments with further incentive
schemes. In our model, the workers are protected by limited liability and
earn strictly positive rents. By combining bonus pay on hierarchy level 2 with
job-promotion, the rent earned by a promoted worker can be used to create
incentives on level 1 as each worker wants to win the tournament and, hence,
the rent on the next level. Interestingly, the use of level 2 rents for creating
incentives on level 1 improves workers’ performances only on level 2, but not
on level 1. If the rent is not too large relative to the optimal tournament
prize spread, the ﬁrm will implement ﬁrst-best eﬀort on the second hierarchy
level. Recently, contract theorists as Schmitz (2005) have pointed out that
optimal bonus payments that lead to positive rents can be reinterpreted as
2See the seminal papers by Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983)
that discuss tournaments in a contract-theoretic context with application to labor eco-
nomics.
3eﬃciency wages. Since rents are strictly increasing in eﬀort in single-agent
hidden action models, the implemented eﬀort level is ineﬃciently small in
the case of continuous eﬀort. However, in our model the ﬁrm implements
ﬁrst-best eﬀort on level 2 although this eﬀort is associated with a strictly
positive rent that also monotonically increases in eﬀort. Therefore, combining
tournaments with bonuses allows for eﬃciency wages in a more literal sense.
Our analysis points to the following trade-oﬀ: on the one hand, the com-
bined use of tournaments and bonuses (combined contract) leads to the ad-
v a n t a g et h a tt h eﬁrm can use workers’ rents for improving incentives. On
the other hand, interlinking incentives on both hierarchy levels restricts the
set of implementable eﬀorts. If the rent on the second hierarchy level is
only moderate, the ﬁrm will clearly proﬁt from a combined contract, but
otherwise either a combined contract or two separate contracts for the two
respective hierarchy levels may be optimal. In a next step, we show that the
ﬁrm will never prefer two separate contracts if, on hierarchy level 2, it can
hire workers from outside. In this situation, the ﬁrm always beneﬁts from a
strictly positive rate of internal job-promotion within a combined contract.
However, it may even improve on the combined contract by allowing external
entry on hierarchy level 2. Such external recruitment is useful for the ﬁrm
in light of the trade-oﬀ mentioned above: if the ﬁrm hires from outside on
level 2, it can choose the optimal separate contract for hierarchy level 2 that
does not impose any further restriction on eﬀort implementation, besides the
usual incentive, participation, and limited-liability constraints.
As a further extension, we introduce heterogeneity of workers. In partic-
ular, we assume symmetric uncertainty about the ability or talent of each
individual worker (i.e., neither the workers nor the ﬁrm can observe individ-
ual talent). In our setting, a worker’s talent and his eﬀort are complements
on each hierarchy level. We show that under heterogeneity the ﬁrm imple-
ments strictly larger eﬀorts on both hierarchy levels when using a combined
contract compared to optimal eﬀorts implemented under separate contracts.
The intuition for this result comes from the fact that high eﬀorts are desir-
able for two distinct reasons within a combined contract: ﬁrst, the higher
workers’ eﬀorts on level 1 the higher will be the probability that the more
4talented worker is promoted to the next level, thus improving the selection
quality of a job-promotion tournament. Second, under a combined contract
all players update their beliefs about the unknown talent of the promoted
worker. Due to the selection properties of the tournament, the posterior ex-
pected talent of the promoted worker is higher than the workers’ expected
talent prior to the tournament. Since talent and eﬀort are complements, the
posterior eﬃcient eﬀort on hierarchy level 2 is also higher than the ex-ante
eﬃcient one.
Our paper is related to those two tournament models that also combine
a rank-order tournament with an additional incentive scheme. Tsoulouhas,
Knoeber, and Agrawal (2007) analyze optimal handicapping of internal and
external candidates in a contest to become CEO. To do so, they also consider
a promotion tournament where the prize is the incentive contract on the next
hierarchy level. However, apart from addressing a quite diﬀerent question,
their model also diﬀers from ours in several respects. First, they do not allow
for relative performance pay on the ﬁrst tier of the hierarchy. Second, they
assume that the ﬁrm cannot commit to a second-period contract at the be-
ginning of the game.3 Furthermore, even though they are of limited liability,
promoted agents do not earn rents because they are assumed to have a suﬃ-
ciently high reservation utility. Schöttner and Thiele (2008) also investigate
incentive contracting within a two-tier hierarchy, but consider a production
environment where there is an individual and contractible performance signal
on the ﬁrst tier. They examine the optimal combination of piece rates for
level 1 workers and a promotion tournament to the next tier.
Ohlendorf and Schmitz (2008) do not analyze tournaments, but combine
two principal-agent contracts in successive periods. As in our model, the
agent is wealth-constrained and earns a non-negative rent that can be used
for incentive purposes. Compared to our paper, Ohlendorf and Schmitz con-
sider a completely diﬀerent scenario with a single agent. In their model, the
principal is integrated in the production process and can invest in each of
the two periods. Hence, the natural application of their model is a supplier-
buyer relationship where the principal can terminate the joint project after
3However, the authors also discuss an extension where commitment is possible.
5the ﬁrst period. In the Ohlendorf-Schmitz paper, optimal second-period in-
centives serve as a carrot or a stick since they depend on ﬁrst-period success.
Since we introduce the possibility of external recruiting in Section 4, our
paper is also related to those tournament models that discuss external hiring
versus internal promotion via tournaments. We show that, under certain
circumstances, the ﬁrm recruits from the external labor market with some
positive probability. The reason is that, by sometimes hiring an external
candidate for the second level, the ﬁrm can mitigate ﬁrst-level incentives.
This is desirable when second-level rents are so high that level 1 workers
tend to work too hard. The point that external recruitment diminishes in-
ternal incentives has also been addressed by Chan (1996). However, while
he emphasizes that external candidates are handicapped to strengthen inter-
nal incentives, we point out the potential existence of a reverse relationship:
in our model, higher-tier workers are recruited from the outside to alleviate
excessive incentives. The existing literature highlights other beneﬁcial as-
pects of external recruitment. For example, Chen (2005) shows that external
recruitment may reduce sabotage and collusion within ﬁrms. Tsoulouhas,
Knoeber and Agrawal (2007) demonstrate that ﬁrms handicap internal can-
didates if external ones are of suﬃciently superior ability.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we introduce our basic model. Section 3 oﬀers a solution to this model,
comparing a combined contract with two separate contracts. In Section 4,
we introduce the possibility of external recruiting. Section 5 extends the
basic model by assuming heterogeneous workers. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Basic Model
We consider two representative periods in the life span of a ﬁrm that consists
of two hierarchy levels. In the ﬁrst period, the ﬁrm employs two homogeneous
workers A and B at hierarchy level 1. Each worker i (i = A,B)e x e r t se ﬀort
ˆ ei ≥ 0 that has the non-veriﬁable monetary value ˆ v(ˆ ei) to the ﬁrm with
ˆ v0 (·) > 0 and ˆ v00(·) ≤ 0.T h eﬁrm neither observes ˆ ei nor ˆ v(ˆ ei),b u tr e c e i v e s
an unveriﬁable, ordinal signal ˆ s ∈ {ˆ sA, ˆ sB} about the relative performance of
6t h et w ow o r k e r s .T h es i g n a lˆ s =ˆ sA indicates that worker A has performed
best, whereas ˆ s =ˆ sB means that worker B has performed better relative to
his co-worker. The probability of the event ˆ s =ˆ sA is given by ˆ p(ˆ eA, ˆ eB) and
that of ˆ s =ˆ sB by 1 − ˆ p(ˆ eA, ˆ eB).
We assume that the probability function ˆ p(ˆ eA,ˆ eB) exhibits the properties
of the well-known contest-success function introduced by Dixit (1987):4
(i) ˆ p(·,·) is symmetric, i.e. ˆ p(ˆ ei, ˆ ej)=1− ˆ p(ˆ ej, ˆ ei),
(ii) ˆ p1 > 0, ˆ p11 < 0, ˆ p2 < 0, ˆ p22 > 0,
(iii) ˆ p12 > 0 ⇔ ˆ p>0.5.
According to (ii), exerting eﬀort has positive but decreasing marginal
returns. Property (iii) means that if, initially, player A has chosen higher
eﬀort than B, a marginal increase in ˆ eB will make it more attractive to A to
increase ˆ eA as well, due to the more intense competition the increase of ˆ eB
has caused.
Spending eﬀort ˆ ei leads to costs ˆ c(ˆ ei) for worker i (i = A,B)w i t hˆ c(0) =
ˆ c0 (0) = 0 and ˆ c0 (ˆ ei) > 0, ˆ c00 (ˆ ei) > 0 for all ˆ ei > 0. Furthermore, to guarantee
some regularity conditions, we make the following technical assumptions. To
ensure concavity of the ﬁrm’s objective function, we assume that ˆ c000 (ˆ ei) ≥ 0
and ∂2
∂ˆ e2 ˆ p1 (ˆ e,ˆ e) ≤ 0. Finally, to obtain an interior solution, we assume that
ˆ c00 (0) = 0.
In the second period, the ﬁrm needs to hire one worker for hierarchy
level 2. Here, in contrast to level 1, a worker’s eﬀort generates an individual
and veriﬁable performance signal. For example, we can think of a two-tier
hierarchy where, at level 1, workers fulﬁll tasks that do not lead to individ-
ually attributable outputs. However, at level 2, we have a managerial task
accompanied by personal responsibility generating a publicly observable per-
formance measure. The position on level 2 may be head of a department or
a division, for example.
Following the binary-signal model by Demougin and Garvie (1991) and
Demougin and Fluet (2001), we assume that the worker on level 2 chooses
eﬀort e ≥ 0 leading to an observable and contractible signal s ∈
©
sL,s Hª
on the worker’s performance with sH >s L.T h e o b s e r v a t i o n s = sH is
4Subscripts of p(·,·) denote partial derivatives.
7favorable information about the worker’s eﬀort choice in the sense of Milgrom
(1981). Let the probability of this favorable outcome be p(e) with p0 (e) > 0
(strict monotone likelihood ratio property) and p00 (e) < 0 (convexity of the
distribution function condition). Moreover, we assume that eﬀort choice e
has the monetary value v(e) to the ﬁrm with v0 (·) > 0 and v00(·) ≤ 0.A g a i n ,
neither e nor v(e) is observable by the ﬁrm.5 Exerting eﬀort e entails costs
c(e) to the worker on level 2 with c(0) = c0 (0) = 0 and c0 (e) > 0, c00(e) > 0
for all e>0. Furthermore, analogous to the technical assumptions for the
ﬁrst hierarchy level, we assume that c000 (e) ≥ 0, p000 (e) ≤ 0,a n dc00(0) = 0.
We assume that all players are risk-neutral. Workers are protected by
limited liability, i.e. they cannot make payments to the ﬁr m .O nb o t ht i e r s
of the hierarchy, workers have zero reservation values. For simplicity, we
neglect discounting.
In the given setting, the ﬁrm can use three diﬀerent instruments to provide
incentives: First, it can employ relative performance pay (i.e. a rank-order
tournament) at hierarchy level 1. Under relative performance pay, the better
performing worker receives a high wage wH whereas the other worker obtains
al o ww a g ewL. Due to limited liability, both wages must be non-negative
(wL,w H ≥ 0). Note that, even though the signal ˆ s is unveriﬁable, relative
performance pay is still feasible due to the self-commitment property of the
ﬁxed tournament prizes wL and wH.6 Second, the ﬁrm can install a bonus
scheme at hierarchy level 2. In case of a favorable signal (s = sH)t h ew o r k e r
gets a high bonus bH, whereas he receives a low bonus bL if the signal is
bad news (s = sL). Again, payments must be non-negative due to limited
liability (bL,b H ≥ 0). Finally, the ﬁrm can design a job-promotion scheme by
announcing that the better performing worker from level 1 will be promoted
to level 2 at the end of the ﬁrst period. This creates indirect incentives for
level 1 if promotion is attractive to a worker.
According to these incentive devices, at the beginning of the ﬁrst period,
the ﬁrm can oﬀer one of the following two types of contracts. Under the
5Note that v(·) measures the worker’s contribution to total ﬁrm proﬁts and is not
identical with department or division proﬁts.
6See Malcomson (1984, 1986) on this important property of tournaments.
8ﬁrst type, the ﬁrm ﬁlls the positions on both hierarchy levels independent of
each other. At the beginning of the ﬁrst period, the ﬁrm oﬀers two workers
a contract (wL,w H). At the end of the ﬁrst period, both workers leave the
ﬁrm. The ﬁrm then oﬀers the contract (bL,b H) t oan e ww o r k e rw h oi st ob e
e m p l o y e da tl e v e l2 .W ec a l lt h i ss c h e m eseparate contracts. The second type
of contract is called a combined contract. In this case, at the start of the ﬁrst
period, the ﬁrm oﬀers two workers a contract (wL,w H,b L,b H), which includes
the promise to promote the better worker at the end of the ﬁrst period. Then,
in the second period, the promoted worker will be rewarded according to the
pre-speciﬁed bonus scheme.7 The worker who did not achieve promotion is
dismissed. Furthermore, we assume that the worker selected for promotion
can quit and realize his zero reservation value in the second period.
The time-schedule of the game can be summarized as follows.
12345
-
ﬁrm oﬀers workers level 1 ﬁrm oﬀers level 2
(wL,w H) accept workers (bL,b H) worker
or or choose ˆ ei; to a new worker chooses e;
(wL,w H, reject payments or promotes payments
bL,b H) are made better worker are made
First, the ﬁrm either oﬀers a separate contract for the ﬁrst tier or a
combined contract to two workers. Then, the workers decide on acceptance
of the contract. At stage 3, the workers exert eﬀorts ˆ eA and ˆ eB on level 1;
workers get wL or wH, respectively, whereas the ﬁrm receives ˆ v(ˆ eA)+ˆ v(ˆ eB).
Thereafter, under separate contracts, the position on hierarchy level 2 is
ﬁlled with a worker that accepts the contract (bL,b H). Under the combined
7We assume that the ﬁrm can commit to such a bonus contract at the beginning of the
ﬁrst period. As will become clear later, this is without loss of generality because under
the optimal contract there is no scope for mutual beneﬁcial renegotiation: ex post, the
ﬁrm would like to lower the bonus, but the agent is always better oﬀ under the original
contract, which pays him a larger rent.
9contract, the ﬁrm promotes the better level 1 worker to the next tier. Finally,
the level 2 worker chooses eﬀort yielding either a low or a high bonus payment
while the ﬁrm earns v(e).
In the following, we will analyze incentives and worker behavior under
both kinds of contracts and discuss whether a combined contract (that in-
cludes a job-promotion scheme) or two separate contracts will be optimal
from the viewpoint of the ﬁrm.
3 Worker Behavior and the Optimal Contract
3.1 Separate Contracts
In this section, we investigate the case of separate contracts (wL,w H) and
(bL,b H). First, we analyze hierarchy level 1. Here, the two workers compete
in a tournament for relative performance pay wH and wL.T o a n a l y z e t h e
ﬁrm’s problem, we ﬁrst characterize the workers’ eﬀort choices. Given the
wages wH and wL,w o r k e rA chooses his eﬀort level to solve
max
ˆ eA
wL +ˆ p(ˆ eA,ˆ eB) · [wH − wL] − ˆ c(ˆ eA) (1)
whereas worker B solves
max
ˆ eB
wL +[ 1− ˆ p(ˆ eA, ˆ eB)] · [wH − wL] − ˆ c(ˆ eB). (2)
The equilibrium eﬀo r tl e v e l sm u s ts a t i s f yt h eﬁrst-order conditions
(wH − wL)ˆ p1 (ˆ eA, ˆ eB)=ˆ c
0 (ˆ eA) and − (wH − wL)ˆ p2 (ˆ eA, ˆ eB)=ˆ c
0 (ˆ eB).
Recall that, due to the symmetry property (i) of the probability function
ˆ p(·,·) we have ˆ p(ˆ eB, ˆ eA)=1− ˆ p(ˆ eA, ˆ eB).D i ﬀerentiating both sides with re-
spect to ˆ eB yields ˆ p1 (ˆ eB, ˆ eA)=−ˆ p2 (ˆ eA, ˆ eB) so that the ﬁrst-order conditions
can be rewritten as
wH − wL =
ˆ c0 (ˆ eA)
ˆ p1 (ˆ eA, ˆ eB)
=
ˆ c0 (ˆ eB)
ˆ p1 (ˆ eB, ˆ eA)
.
10Thus, we have a unique symmetric equilibrium (ˆ eA, ˆ eB)=( ˆ e,ˆ e) given by
wH − wL =
ˆ c0 (ˆ e)
ˆ p1 (ˆ e,ˆ e)
. (3)
Our assumptions do not rule out the existence of additional asymmetric
equilibria. However, in the following, we restrict attention to the symmetric
equilibrium, which seems plausible in the given setting with homogeneous
contestants.8 Condition (3) shows that equilibrium eﬀorts increase in the
tournament prize spread wH − wL.9 To simplify notation, we denote by
∆w(ˆ e) the prize spread that induces the eﬀort level ˆ e, i.e.,
∆w(ˆ e): =
ˆ c0 (ˆ e)
ˆ p1 (ˆ e, ˆ e)
(4)
The ﬁrm maximizes 2ˆ v(ˆ e)−wL −wH subject to the incentive constraint




(wH − wL) − c(ˆ e) ≥ 0, (5)
and the limited-liability constraints
wL,w H ≥ 0. (6)
Note that, under the equilibrium eﬀort ˆ e, a worker must obtain at least the




∆w(ˆ e) − c(ˆ e) ≥ wL +ˆ p(0,ˆ e)∆w(ˆ e) − c(0). (7)
Hence, 1
2∆w(ˆ e)−c(ˆ e) ≥ 0, implying that the ﬁrm optimally chooses ws
L =0 .
8For example, asymmetric equilibria do not exist if the probability function is described
by the well-known Tullock or logit-form contest-success function. Also, in case of the
Lazear-Rosen or probit contest-success function (which does not have the properties (ii)
and (iii), however), pure-strategy equilibria are unique and symmetric.
9Note that ∂
∂ˆ e ˆ p1 (ˆ e, ˆ e)=ˆ p11 (ˆ e, ˆ e)+ˆ p12 (ˆ e, ˆ e) < 0 due to properties (ii) and (iii) of the
probability function.
10Note that, in the symmetric equilibrium, each worker’s winning probability is 1/2.
11Together with (3), it follows that ws
H = ∆w(ˆ e) is optimal. Thus, the ﬁrm
implements the eﬀort level ˆ es > 0 given by11
ˆ e
s =a r gm a x
ˆ e
2ˆ v(ˆ e) − ∆w(ˆ e).




v(e) − bL − p(e) · (bH − bL)
s.t. e =a r gm a x
z {bL + p(z) · (bH − bL) − c(z)} (8)
bL + p(e) · (bH − bL) − c(e) ≥ 0 (9)
bL,b H ≥ 0 (10)
The ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt net of wage payments taking into account
the incentive compatibility constraint (8), the participation constraint (9),
and the limited liability constraints (10). Due to the monotone likelihood
ratio property and the convexity of the distribution function condition, the
incentive constraint (8) is equivalent to its ﬁrst-order condition




Using this relationship, the ﬁrm’s problem can be transformed to
max
bL,e
v(e) − bL − p(e) ·
c0 (e)
p0 (e)
s.t. bL + p(e) ·
c0 (e)
p0 (e)
− c(e) ≥ 0 (12)
bL ≥ 0.
Regarding the participation constraint, we can make the following observa-
tion, which is important for our further analysis.
11The second-order condition 2ˆ v00 (ˆ e) − ∆w00(ˆ e) < 0 is satisﬁed due to our technical
assumptions ˆ c000(ˆ e) ≥ 0 and ∂2
∂ˆ e2 ˆ p1 (ˆ e, ˆ e) ≤ 0. A ni n t e r i o rs o l u t i o ni sg u a r a n t e e db yt h e
assumption ˆ c00(0) = 0.F o r∆w00(ˆ e) > 0 see the additional pages for the referees.





is strictly positive and monotonically increasing for all e>0.
Proof. r(e) > 0 can be rewritten as c(e) − c0 (e)
p(e)
p0(e) < 0.N o t e t h a t
p(e)
p0(e) >e⇔ p(e) − ep0 (e) > 0 is true since p(·) is strictly concave. But then
we also have c(e)−c0 (e)
p(e)
p0(e) <c(e)−ec0 (e) < 0 from the strict convexity of





is positive for all e>0
by strict concavity of p(e) and strict convexity of c(e).
Hence, given e, the transformed participation constraint (12) is satisﬁed
for all bL ≥ 0. Therefore, the ﬁrm optimally sets bs
L =0 .I n t u i t i v e l y ,u n d e r
each bonus spread bH − bL that induces e, the ﬁrm chooses the one that
minimizes expected wage costs, which is the case if bs
L =0 . After substituting
bs
L into the ﬁrm’s objective function, we obtain that the ﬁrm induces the eﬀort
level es > 0 given by12
e
s =a r gm a x
e v(e) − r(e) − c(e).
The results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Under separate contracts, the ﬁrm implements the eﬀort lev-
els
ˆ e
s =a r gm a x
ˆ e
2ˆ v(ˆ e) − ∆w(ˆ e), (14)
e
s =a r gm a x
e v(e) − r(e) − c(e). (15)
The optimal contract elements are
w
s
L =0 , w
s
H = ∆w(ˆ e
s), b
s






where ∆w(ˆ e) and r(e) are given by (4) and (13), respectively.
12Due to our technical assumptions, the objective function is strictly concave. Fur-
thermore, the assumption c00(0) = 0 ensures an interior solution. For r00 (e) > 0 see the
additional pages for the referees.
13From Lemma 1, it follows that the worker on level 2 earns a strictly
positive rent r(es).T h i ss u g g e s t st h a tt h eﬁrm may be able to beneﬁtf r o ma
job-promotion scheme where the better performing level 1 worker is promoted
to the next hierarchy level. Then, the rent provides additional eﬀort incentive
at the ﬁrst hierarchy level. This is the case under a combined contract, which
we analyze in the following section.
3.2 Combined Contract
Under a combined contract (wL,w H,b L,b H),t h eﬁrm speciﬁes wL,w H,b L,
and bH at the beginning of the ﬁrst period. At the end of the ﬁrst period,
the better performing level 1 worker will be promoted to level 2. We solve
the game by backwards induction. In the second period, all payments and
costs from hierarchy level 1 are sunk. Thus, given the bonus payments bL
and bH, the promoted worker faces the same kind of decision problem as
under separate contracts. Provided that his participation constraint (9) is
satisﬁed, he chooses the eﬀort level characterized by (8). In the ﬁrst period,
however, workers’ optimization problems fundamentally diﬀer from the case
of two separate contracts. Now, increasing eﬀort also raises the chance of
being promoted and, consequently, earning a rent under the bonus contract.
Hence, worker A’s and B’s optimization problem, respectively, is
max
ˆ eA
wL +ˆ p(ˆ eA,ˆ eB) · [wH − wL + bL + p(e)(bH − bL) − c(e)] − ˆ c(ˆ eA) (17)
max
ˆ eB
wL +[ 1− ˆ p(ˆ eA, ˆ eB)] · [wH − wL + bL + p(e)(bH − bL) − c(e)] − ˆ c(ˆ eB).
(18)
Comparing the workers’ objective functions with those under separate con-
tracts, (1) and (2), we can see that, under combined contracts, the “prize”
of performing better at level 1 increases by the expected payment of the pro-
moted worker, bL + p(e)(bH − bL) − c(e). Analogous to the case of separate
contracts, one can show that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium given
by
ˆ p1 (ˆ e, ˆ e)[wH − wL + bL + p(e)(bH − bL) − c(e)] = ˆ c
0 (ˆ e). (19)




(wH − wL + bL + p(e)(bH − bL) − c(e)) − ˆ c(ˆ e) ≥ 0. (20)
We can now state the ﬁrm’s optimization problem as
max
e,ˆ e,wL,wH,bH,bL
[2ˆ v(ˆ e) − wL − wH]+[ v(e) − bL − p(e)(bH − bL)] (21)
subject to (8), (9), (19), (20), (22)
wL,w H,b L,b H ≥ 0. (23)
By solving this problem, we obtain the following result.






{2ˆ v(ˆ e) − ∆w(ˆ e)+v(e) − c(e)} (24)
subject to ∆w(ˆ e) − r(e) ≥ 0. (25)
Furthermore, the optimal contract elements are
w
c
L =0 , w
c










where ∆w(ˆ e) and r(e) are given by (4) and (13), respectively.
Proof. See Appendix.
3.3 Comparison of the Two Contracts
We can now compare the optimal separate contracts, as given in Proposi-
tion 1, with the optimal combined contract, which we have just derived in
Proposition 2. Our conjecture was that the combined contract may have the
advantage of partially substituting direct ﬁrst-level incentives wH−wL for in-
direct incentives which arise due to the expected second-period rent r(e).B y
comparing the optimal contract elements (16) and (26), we can see that this
15is indeed the case. If, under separate contracts, the ﬁrm wanted to induce
the same eﬀort levels (ˆ ec,e c) as under the combined contract, it would have
to pay the same second-level high bonus bH = bc
H, but a higher reward for
better relative performance at the ﬁrst stage, i.e., wH = ∆w(ˆ ec). By contrast,
under combined contracts, the ﬁrm can reduce wH by the second-period rent
r(ec).
However, interlinking ﬁrst- and second-period incentives may also have a
detrimental eﬀect. To see this, assume that the ﬁrm wishes to induce a certain
second-period eﬀort e. Then, to induce a relatively low ﬁrst-period eﬀort ˆ e
with ∆w(ˆ e) <r (e),t h eﬁrm must oﬀer “adverse” relative performance pay at
level 1, i.e., the ﬁrm must reward the worker who performed worse, wL >w H.
The proof of Proposition 2 shows that such a relative performance scheme
cannot be optimal from the ﬁrm’s point of view. Intuitively, wL >w H means
that the ﬁrm pays for reducing ﬁrst-level incentives. However, the ﬁrm would
be better oﬀ by setting wH = wL =0 , thereby increasing ﬁrst-level eﬀort
and decreasing ﬁrst-level rents. Consequently, under a combined contract,
the ﬁrm induces only those eﬀort levels that satisfy constraint (25), whereas
such a restriction is not present under separate contracts.
To decide under which circumstances a combined contract dominates
a separate contract, we have to distinguish whether (25) is binding under
the optimal combined contract or not. First, assume the constraint is non-
binding. Then, a comparison of the objective functions in (14), (15), and
(24) immediately reveals that the ﬁrm prefers the combined contract. For
each combination of eﬀorts (ˆ e,e), implementation costs under a combined
contract, ∆w(ˆ e)+c(e), are lower than implementation costs under separate
contracts, ∆w(ˆ e)+r(e)+c(e). This is because, by Lemma 1, r(e) > 0 for
e>0. Also note that, under the combined contract, eﬀort on the second
hierarchy level corresponds to the ﬁrst-best eﬀort level, i.e.,
e
c = e
FB =a r gm a x
e {v(e) − c(e)}.
Concerning the ﬁrst hierarchy level, however, the comparison of (14) and
(24) points out that ˆ ec =ˆ es. Interestingly, the use of the rent r(e) for
16incentive purposes on hierarchy level 1 does not lead to improved incentives
on that hierarchy level. Instead, the indirect incentives are completely used
to improve incentives at the second level. This result is due to the fact
that raising incentives on the second hierarchy level increases eﬀorts on both
levels, but level 1 eﬀorts are then decreased again by a pure substitution of
direct incentives wH − wL for indirect ones.
In the last decade, contract theorists have reconsidered the concept of
eﬃciency wages. According to Tirole (1999, p. 745), Laﬀont and Martimort
(2002, p. 174) and Schmitz (2005) eﬃciency wages occur if workers are pro-
tected by limited liability and earn positive rents under the optimal contract.
Of course, in their models the implemented eﬀort level is ineﬃciently small.
Interestingly, in our setting the ﬁrm implements the eﬃcient eﬀort level eFB
although implementation is associated with a strictly positive rent that is
monotonically increasing in eﬀort. Hence, combining both hierarchy levels
for creating optimal incentives allows for eﬃciency wages in a more literal
sense. As a crucial condition, the expected rent r(eFB) is not allowed to be-
come arbitrarily large. Then, restriction (25) will be binding at the optimal
solution, which leads us to the second case.
If restriction (25) is binding, the ﬁrm still proﬁts from using the second-
period rent for creating incentives on level 1. In fact, the ﬁrm solely relies
on indirect incentives via the second-period rent (since ∆w(ˆ ec)=r(ec),w e
must have wc
H =0 ). However, this also means that second-period incentives
tend to be too strong, so that the previously discussed detrimental eﬀect
from interlinking the two levels arises. Then, separate contracts may become
optimal. Overall, we have the following results:
Proposition 3 (i) If restriction (25) is non-binding, the combined contract








17(ii) If restriction (25) is binding, the ﬁrm implements
ˆ e










c) > 2ˆ v(ˆ e
s)+v(e





The proposition shows that if the rent for implementing ﬁrst-best eﬀort
eFB on hierarchy level 2 is not too large (i.e. (25) is non-binding), it is optimal
for the ﬁrm to use all three incentive schemes via a combined contract: ﬁrst,
the ﬁrm makes use of moderate relative performance pay on the ﬁrst tier
of the hierarchy by choosing a tournament winner prize wc
H = ∆w(ˆ ec) −
r(eFB) > 0, which is smaller than the winner prize under separate contracts,
ws
H = ∆w(ˆ ec) (with ˆ es =ˆ ec). Second, it installs high-powered incentives via
a bonus system on level 2 of the hierarchy; whereas the optimal bonus is zero
in case of an unfavorable performance signal (bc




p0(eFB) in case of a favorable signal, which is larger than
that under two separate contracts (bs
H =
c0(es)
p0(es)). Third, since the ﬁrm prefers
the combined contract to separate contracts, it also uses a job-promotion
scheme, which creates indirect incentives by the expected rent on the second
level of the hierarchy.
If the rent for implementing eFB is too large (i.e. (25) is binding), the ﬁrm
faces the following trade-oﬀ: on the one hand, the combined contract leads
to larger eﬀort levels than the separate contracts, yielding a higher monetary
value to the ﬁrm, 2ˆ v(ˆ ec)+v(ec) > 2ˆ v(ˆ es)+v(es). On the other hand, high
eﬀorts lead to rather high implementation costs, so that it is not clear whether
the use of indirect incentives under the combined contract is accompanied
by lower labor costs. If the combined contract is still dominating, the ﬁrm
utilizes a bonus scheme and a job-promotion scheme but foregoes relative
performance pay (i.e. wc
L = wc
H =0 ). If, however, separate contracts are
advantageous to the ﬁrm because of lower implementation costs, it will make
18use of relative performance pay and a bonus system but renounce a job-
promotion scheme.
Interestingly, our results nicely explain those empirical ﬁndings of Baker,
Gibbs and Holmström (1994a, 1994b) that seem to be puzzling in the light
of standard tournament models.13 First, Baker, Gibbs and Holmström ﬁnd
that there is considerable variation in pay on each hierarchy level (see, for
example, Figure VI in Baker, Gibbs and Holmström 1994a, p. 906). This
ﬁnding contradicts the important prerequisite of tournament models that
wages must be attached to jobs and, therefore, to hierarchy levels in order
to generate incentives. However, if a combined contract dominates separate
contracts, we will have a job-promotion scheme with pay variation because
the promoted worker may earn diﬀerent bonus payments on hierarchy level 2.
Second, according to standard tournament theory, hierarchical wage diﬀer-
ences should be completely explained by promotion premiums paid to workers
when moving to higher levels in the hierarchy. Unfortunately, Baker, Gibbs
and Holmström (1994a) ﬁnd that "promotion premiums explain only part of
the diﬀerences in pay between levels" (p. 909). In fact, often hierarchical
wage diﬀerences are even ﬁve times higher or more than the correspond-
ing promotion premiums. This puzzle can be explained using the optimal
combined contract of our model. Here, a promoted worker does not only
earn the promotion premium wH − wL but also possible bonus payments.
In particular, the higher the expected rent on hierarchy level 2 the smaller
will be the promotion premium in our model since direct relative incentives
are replaced with indirect incentives. If, in general, exerting eﬀort on higher
hierarchy levels is more valuable to ﬁrms than eﬀort choices on lower levels,
we will have considerable rents on higher tiers, thus reducing corresponding
promotion premiums.
13Note that the same two puzzles are also found by Treble et al. (2001), who analyzed a
British ﬁrm and not a US corporation. Considerable wage variation within job levels is also
documented by the empirical studies of Seltzer and Merrett (2000), Dohmen, Kriechel and
Pfann (2004), Gibbs and Hendricks (2004) and Grund (2005). Moreover, Dohmen, Kriechel
and Pfann (2004) show that promotion and wage increase are often not simultaneous,
which gives further evidence that salaries are also determined by bonuses and not solely
by promotion premiums.
194 External Recruitment
In the last section, we have seen that a combined contract dominates separate
contracts when the second-level rent r(eFB) is smaller than ∆w(ˆ es),t h ew i n -
ner prize on level 1 under separate contracts. If this is not the case, however,
combined contracts may be inferior because they make the implementation
of low ﬁrst-level eﬀort expensive. To counteract this problem, the ﬁrm could
sometimes recruit level 2 workers from the external labor market. Then, level
1 workers do not always “win” the second-level rent. Consequently, ﬁrst-level
incentives and eﬀort decreases. A further advantage of this approach is that,
to an external candidate, the ﬁrm can oﬀer the contract (bs
L,b s
H),w h i c hex
post dominates the bonus scheme (bc
L,b c
H) of an internally promoted worker.
To allow for the possibility of external recruitment, we assume that the
ﬁrm commits to promote the better performing level 1 worker with proba-
bility α ∈ [0,1]. With probability 1−α,t h eﬁrm hires a level 2 worker from
outside. Thus, the contract oﬀered in stage 1 of the game is now given by
(wL,w H,b L,b H,α).14 Note that this speciﬁcation includes the two previously
analyzed contracts: α =0is equivalent to the case of separate contracts
(Section 3.1) and α =1corresponds to the combined contract without exter-
nal recruitment (Section 3.2). We assume that the ﬁrm is able to commit to
a certain value of α at the beginning of the ﬁrst period. Note, however, that
this assumption implies that the ﬁrm cares about its reputation in future
employment relationships. If there are no such future relationships, the ﬁrm
would ex post always want to hire an external candidate, since it can oﬀer
him the ex post optimal bonus contract. In practice, we can think of 1 − α
as the proportion of times when the ﬁrm ﬁlls the second-level position with
an external candidate.
The possibility of external promotion modiﬁes the incentive structure on
level 1. On level 2, however, the structure of an internally promoted worker’s
decision problem remains unchanged. Assume that e satisﬁes the second-
level incentive compatibility constraint (8) and, moreover, the second-level
14As an alternative to external recruitment, the ﬁrm could sometimes neglect ﬁrst-level
performance when making the promotion decision. Then, the promotion decision is made
purely randomly. We discuss this case at the end of this section.
20participation constraint (9) holds. Then, at the ﬁrst level, worker A chooses
ˆ eA to maximize
wL+ˆ p(ˆ eA,ˆ eB)(wH −wL)+α· ˆ p(ˆ eA, ˆ eB)·[bL+p(e)(bH −bL)−c(e)]−ˆ c(ˆ eA),
whereas, by choosing ˆ eB,w o r k e rB maximizes
wL+(1 − ˆ p(ˆ eA,ˆ eB))(wH−wL)+α·(1 − ˆ p(ˆ eA, ˆ eB))·[bL+p(e)(bH−bL)−c(e)]−ˆ c(ˆ eB).
Thus, the symmetric equilibrium on level 1 is implicitly given by
ˆ p1 (ˆ e,ˆ e)(wH − wL + α[bL + p(e)(bH − bL) − c(e)]) = ˆ c
0 (ˆ e). (27)







α[bL + p(e)(bH − bL) − c(e)] − ˆ c(ˆ e) ≥ 0. (28)




2ˆ v(ˆ e) − wL − wH + α[v(e) − bL − p(e)(bH − bL)] + (1 − α)E
subject to (8), (9), (27), (28), (23).
Here, E denotes the ﬁrm’s proﬁt from hiring an external candidate for the
job on the second hierarchy tier. To such a candidate, the ﬁrm oﬀers the
optimal separate contract. Consequently, we have E = v(es) −r(es) − c(es).
The restrictions (8) and (9) are the incentive compatibility and participation
constraints, respectively, for level 2. Conditions (27) and (28) are the new
incentive compatibility constraint and participation constraint, respectively,
for level 1. Finally, (23) are the limited liability constraints.
By solving this problem, we obtain the following results.15




H,α r) comprises a
15The superscript "r" indicates that the optimal contract considered in this section
includes a rule for recruiting from outside.
21strictly positive probability of internal promotion, i.e., αr > 0.
(ii) External recruitment is excluded, i.e. αr =1 ,i fr(eFB) ≤ ∆w(ˆ es).T h e n ,
















the probability of recruiting from the external labor market will be strictly
positive, i.e. αr < 1.I f αr < 1,w eh a v e∆w(ˆ er) <r (er). Moreover,
ˆ es < ˆ er ≤ ˆ ec and ec ≤ er <e FB.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proposition shows that the ﬁrm always integrates the opportunity of
internal job-promotion in the optimal contract. In other words, it is never
beneﬁcial to exclusively hire from the external labor market or, equivalently,
to have a separate contract as analyzed in Section 3.1. Intuitively, at least to
some extent, the ﬁrm should use the second-level rent to provide incentives
for ﬁrst-level workers. If r(eFB) ≤ ∆w(ˆ es),w eh a v eαr =1 ,s ot h a tt h e
combined contract without external recruitment as speciﬁed in Section 3.2 is
still optimal. If r(eFB) > ∆w(ˆ es), however, external recruitment may occur.
Then, the ﬁrm implements eﬀort levels that it would never want to induce
under a combined contract without external recruitment, i.e. ∆w(ˆ er) <
r(er).M o r e s p e c i ﬁcally, the ﬁrm induces lower eﬀort on level 1 and higher
eﬀort on level 2 relative to the combined contract, which leads to strict
improvement of the combined contract.
Condition (29) points out that deviating from α =1to a strictly positive
probability of external recruitment (i.e., α<1) has two advantages and one
disadvantage:16 ﬁrst, the ﬁrm beneﬁts from choosing the optimal separate
contract for level 2 in case of external recruitment, leading to proﬁts E.
This contract is beneﬁcial since it maximizes level 2 proﬁts. Second, the
proﬁt associated with level 2 under a combined contract is realized less often
which is detrimental, as indicated by the right-hand side of (29). Third, in
16In the Appendix we show for a quadratic cost function, a linear value function and a
Tullock or logit-form contests-success function that this condition can indeed be satisﬁed.
22cases where this proﬁt is realized it will be larger than under α =1 .T h i s
positive eﬀe c ti ss h o w nb yt h es e c o n dt e r mo nt h el e f t - h a n ds i d eo f( 2 9 ) .
Here, [v0(ec) − c0(ec)] denotes the increase in level 2 proﬁts under a combined
contract by marginally raising e at e = ec. Recall that the strictly concave
function v(e) − c(e) has its maximum at e = eFB so that raising eﬀort from
ec <e FB to er, ec <e r <e FB,i sb e n e ﬁcial for the ﬁrm. The term
r(ec)
r0(ec)
describes how much level 2 eﬀort e rises due to a marginal decrease in α at










Altogether, if the ﬁr s ta n dt h et h i r de ﬀect together dominate the second
eﬀect, a strictly positive probability of recruiting from outside will be optimal
for the ﬁrm.17 In the proof of Proposition 4 we show that, if αr < 1,i ti s
given by αr = ∆w(ˆ er)/r(er). Consequently, external recruitment occurs more
often if ∆w(ˆ er) is small relative to r(er), implying that ﬁrst-level incentives
are low-powered compared to second-level ones. This is what constitutes
the beneﬁt of supplementing a combined contract with external recruitment:
it allows to implement lower eﬀort on the ﬁrst tier (ˆ er ≤ ˆ ec) while further
increasing eﬀort on the second tier (ec ≤ er).
Our ﬁndings on the optimality of external recruitment ﬁts quite well with
another puzzle raised by the empirical literature on internal labor markets:
several empirical studies document that there exist ports of entry on many
hierarchy levels in diverse ﬁrms from diﬀerent countries.18 This ﬁnding is
puzzling in the light of standard tournament theory because generating in-
centives by a job-promotion tournament requires a strict ban on external re-
cruiting.19 However, the results of Proposition 4 show that including bonus
17Note that condition (29) is suﬃcient and may be too strong. Indeed, since ˆ er ≤ ˆ ec
and er ≥ ec the ﬁrm may not only beneﬁt from external recruiting by increasing level 2
eﬀort, but also by decreasing level 1 eﬀort. Recall that ˆ ec is larger than eﬀort level ˆ es that
maximizes level 1 proﬁts, characterized by (14) (see Proposition 3).
18See Lazear (1992), Baker, Gibbs and Holmström (1994a, 1994b), Ariga, Ohkusa and
Brunello (1999), Seltzer and Merrett (2000), Dohmen, Kriechel and Pfann (2004), Gibbs
and Hendricks (2004) and Grund (2005).
19Standard tournament theory suggests a strict ban as long as one exclusively focuses
23schemes at higher hierarchy levels can lead to a completely diﬀerent situation
compared to the standard tournament model, which analyzes job-promotion
in isolation. External recruiting now allows the ﬁrm to ﬁne-tune incentives,
thereby improving combined contracts.
As an alternative to external recruitment, the ﬁrm could employ a promo-
tion policy where the ﬁrst-period performance signal is sometimes neglected.
Then, the promotion decision is made randomly, e.g. by tossing a coin. How-
ever, such a procedure introduces new commitment problems on the side of
the ﬁrm. To see this, assume that the bonus contract is contingent on the
nature of the promotion decision, i.e. whether it had been based on ﬁrst-
level performance or random selection. Then, there is a potential source of
conﬂict between the promoted worker and the ﬁrm: the worker prefers the
contract with the higher bonus, which makes him work harder but also earns
him a higher rent. By contrast, ex post, the ﬁrm will usually favor the con-
tract with the lower rent. Thus, since in general a third party is not able
to observe the true nature of the promotion decision, it is diﬃcult to make
contracts contingent on it, even if the ﬁrm cares about its reputation in fu-
ture relationships. Thus, it might be more realistic to assume that, under
internal random promotion, the bonus contract is independent of the nature
of promotion. In this case, however, external recruitment dominates a ran-
dom internal promotion procedure since, under the former, diﬀerent bonus
contracts are feasible.
Nevertheless, under certain circumstances, external recruitment is not
desirable, e.g. if level 1 workers acquire ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital that sig-
niﬁcantly raises their productivity on level 2. Then, it can be shown that,
under random internal promotion with non-contingent bonus contracts, the
probability of basing promotion on ﬁrst-level performance is always strictly
positive. Hence, analogous to the case of external recruitment, purely sepa-
rate contracts are never optimal.20
on the provision of incentives (as we have done so far) and excludes harmful activities,
such as sabotage, or selection aspects.
20Formal proofs of the arguments from this paragraph are available from the authors
upon request.
245 Heterogeneous Workers
Typically, real workers are not homogeneous as assumed in our basic model.
In this section, we skip the homogeneity assumption and introduce workers
that diﬀer in their talents or abilities. Thereafter, we will analyze which type
of contract — separate contracts or a combined contract — will be advantageous
for the ﬁrm in this more realistic setting.
5.1 Modiﬁcations of the Basic Model
We assume that either worker may have high talent t1 or low talent t0 with
t1 >t 0 > 0, and that neither the workers nor the ﬁrm observe the workers’
individual talents during the whole game. In other words, we introduce
symmetric uncertainty about the quality of the workers.21 Let all players
(i.e. the workers and the ﬁrm) have the same prior distribution about worker
talent. For simplicity, let each talent be equally likely so that unknown talent
can be described by a random variable t that takes values t0 and t1 with
probability 1
2, respectively, and has mean E [t]=( t0 + t1)/2.
On each hierarchy level, a worker’s talent inﬂuences both the value of
eﬀort for the ﬁrm and the probability of generating a favorable signal. Let
the value of worker i (i = A,B)t ot h eﬁrm when exerting eﬀort ˆ ei on level 1
be t·ˆ v(ˆ ei), and that on level 2 when choosing eﬀort ei be t·v(ei).I na n a l o g y ,
the probability of a favorable signal on level 2 is now given by t · p(e),w i t h
t1 · p(e) ≤ 1, ∀e. For a relative performance signal on level 1 we have to
diﬀerentiate four possible situations. If both workers have equal talents, A’s
probability of winning the tournament will again be described by the function
ˆ p(ˆ eA, ˆ eB). In addition, now we also have two possible asymmetric pairings.
If worker A has high talent t1 and worker B low talent t0, A’s probability of
getting the better evaluation will be described by ˆ p(ˆ eA,ˆ eB;t1) whereas B’s
one is given by 1 − ˆ p(ˆ eA, ˆ eB;t1). In the opposite asymmetric case with B
being more talented than A,w o r k e rA wins the tournament with probability
21The assumption of symmetric talent uncertainty is widespread in labor economics. See,
among many others, Harris and Holmström (1982), Murphy (1986), Holmström (1999) and
Gibbons and Waldman (1999).
25ˆ p(ˆ eA, ˆ eB;t0) and B with probability 1 − ˆ p(ˆ eA, ˆ eB;t0).
We assume that the new probability functions have analogous properties
(i)—(iii) as the function ˆ p(·,·) (see Section 2). For example, in the basic
model we have ˆ p1 (ˆ ej, ˆ ei)=−ˆ p2 (ˆ ei, ˆ ej), which follows from the symmetry
assumption (i). In analogy, we assume that also in heterogeneous pairings
the speciﬁc identity of a certain worker does not have any inﬂuence on his
(marginal) winning probability, that is whether a worker acts on the ﬁrst or
on the second position in ˆ p(·,·;t) does not inﬂuence the (marginal) returns
of his eﬀort choice for a given asymmetric pairing. Technically, this means
that ˆ p(ˆ ei, ˆ ej;t1)=1− ˆ p(ˆ ej,ˆ ei;t0), implying
ˆ p1 (ˆ ei, ˆ ej;t1)=−ˆ p2 (ˆ ej,ˆ ei;t0) and ˆ p2 (ˆ ei,ˆ ej;t1)=−ˆ p1 (ˆ ej, ˆ ei;t0) (30)
for i,j = A,B; i 6= j. Of course, talent should have an impact on a worker’s
absolute winning probability and his marginal one. In particular, we assume
that, for given eﬀort levels, the more talented worker has a higher winning
probability than the less talented one:
ˆ p(ˆ ei, ˆ ej;t1) > ˆ p(ˆ ei, ˆ ej;t0). (31)
Furthermore, let eﬀort and talent be complements in the sense of
ˆ p1 (ˆ ei, ˆ ej;t1) > ˆ p1 (ˆ ei, ˆ ej;t0) and − ˆ p2 (ˆ ei, ˆ ej;t0) > −ˆ p2 (ˆ ei,ˆ ej;t1), (32)
that is marginally increasing eﬀort is more eﬀective under high talent than
under low one. Properties (ii) and (iii) from the basic model should also hold
analogously for heterogeneous workers. Note that property (iii) together with
symmetry here implies that ˆ p12 (ˆ e,ˆ e;t1)=−ˆ p12 (ˆ e, ˆ e;t0):i fw o r k e r sc h o o s e
identical eﬀorts the more able one has a higher winning probability; if now
the other worker increases his eﬀort, competition becomes more intense so
that the more able worker raises his eﬀort, too. Again, this eﬀect should be
independent of whether a worker acts on the ﬁrst or on the second position
in ˆ p(·,·;t). Finally, we assume analogous regularity conditions to hold as in
the basic model with homogeneous workers.
26In the following, we will investigate how the comparison between separate
contracts and a combined contract will change when workers are heteroge-
neous.
5.2 Separate Contracts
Under worker heterogeneity, the equilibrium on hierarchy level 1 is charac-









(−ˆ p2 (ˆ eA, ˆ eB;t1) − ˆ p2 (ˆ eA,ˆ eB;t0) − 2ˆ p2 (ˆ eA, ˆ eB)) = ˆ c
0 (ˆ eB).
Using ˆ p1 (ˆ eB,ˆ eA)=−ˆ p2 (ˆ eA, ˆ eB) and (30) shows that there exists a symmetric
equilibrium in which each worker chooses ˆ e characterized by
wH − wL = ∆˜ w(ˆ e) (33)
with ∆˜ w(ˆ e): =
4ˆ c0 (ˆ e)
ˆ p1 (ˆ e, ˆ e;t1)+ˆ p1 (ˆ e, ˆ e;t0)+2ˆ p1 (ˆ e, ˆ e)
(34)
and ∆˜ w0(ˆ e) > 0.22 The ﬁrm maximizes 2E [t]ˆ v(ˆ e) − wL − wH subject to
the participation constraint (5),23 the limited-liability constraints (6) and
the incentive constraint (33). The optimal tournament prizes are, therefore,
given by ws
L =0and ws





2E [t]ˆ v(ˆ e) − ∆˜ w(ˆ e). (35)
22Note that ∂
∂ˆ e (ˆ p1 (ˆ e, ˆ e;t1)+ˆ p1 (ˆ e, ˆ e;t0)+2ˆ p1 (ˆ e, ˆ e)) = ˆ p11 (ˆ e, ˆ e;t1)+ˆ p12 (ˆ e, ˆ e;t1)+
ˆ p11 (ˆ e, ˆ e;t0)+ ˆ p12 (ˆ e, ˆ e;t0)+2ˆ p11 (ˆ e, ˆ e)+2ˆ p12 (ˆ e, ˆ e) < 0.
23Note that, due to the symmetric equilibrium, the participation constraint will be the
same as in the basic model.
24Here and in the following, the subscript "h" for optimal eﬀorts indicates heterogeneity
of workers.
27On hierarchy level 2, the ﬁrm’s optimization problem now reads as
max
bL,bH,e
E [t]v(e) − bL − E [t]p(e)(bH − bL)
subject to e =a r gm a x
z {bL + E [t]p(z)(bH − bL) − c(z)}
bL + E [t]p(e)(bH − bL) − c(e) ≥ 0
bL,b H ≥ 0.
In analogy to the basic model, the incentive constraint can be replaced with
the ﬁrst-order condition bH − bL =
c0(e)
E[t]p0(e). It is straightforward to show
t h a t ,u n d e rt h eo p t i m a lb o n u sc o n t r a c t ,bs
L =0 , the participation constraint




h =a r gm a x
e E [t]v(e) − r(e) − c(e) (36)
and r(e) being deﬁned in (13). Altogether, the comparison of (35) and (36)
with (14) and (15) from the basic model shows that introducing heterogeneity
leads to changes in the expected values of the workers’ eﬀort choices and in
the optimal winner prize w∗
H, but leaves the implementation costs on level 2
unchanged for a given eﬀort level e.
5.3 Combined Contract
Solving the game by backwards induction, we ﬁrst consider the actions on
hierarchy level 2. Here, all players update their beliefs about the unknown
talent of the promoted worker. Let E [t|ˆ s] denote the expected talent of the
promoted worker, that is each player calculates a new expectation depending
on the realization of the relative performance signal ˆ s.N o t et h a ta ta n yp r i o r
p o i n ti nt i m et h ew o r k e r sa sw e l la st h eﬁrm already know that they have to
update their beliefs in light of the promotion decision and that they will not
receive further information. Hence, when designing the optimal combined
contract, the ﬁrm has to include the incentive constraint
bH − bL =
c0 (e)
E [t|ˆ s]p0 (e)
(37)
28and the participation constraint
bL + E [t|ˆ s]p(e)(bH − bL) − c(e) ≥ 0 ⇔ bL + r(e) ≥ 0, (38)
where the last inequality follows from (13) and (37).
A tl e v e l1 ,w o r k e rA and worker B maximize




(ˆ p(ˆ eA, ˆ eB;t1)+ˆ p(ˆ eA, ˆ eB;t0)+2ˆ p(ˆ eA, ˆ eB)) − ˆ c(ˆ eA) and




((1 − ˆ p(ˆ eA, ˆ eB;t1)) + (1 − ˆ p(ˆ eA, ˆ eB;t0)) + 2(1 − ˆ p(ˆ eA, ˆ eB))) − ˆ c(ˆ eB),
respectively. Equations (37) and (13) together with the ﬁrst-order conditions,
ˆ p1 (ˆ eB, ˆ eA)=−ˆ p2 (ˆ eA,ˆ eB) and (30) yield
(wH − wL + bL + r(e))




(wH − wL + bL + r(e))




Thus, in the symmetric equilibrium each worker exerts ˆ e described by
wH − wL + bL + r(e)=∆˜ w(ˆ e) (39)
with ∆˜ w(ˆ e) being deﬁned in (34).
N o ww ec a ns u m m a r i z et h eﬁrm’s problem. It maximizes
2E [t]ˆ v(ˆ e) − 2wL − (wH − wL)+E [t|ˆ s]v(e) − bL − E [t|ˆ s]p(e)(bH − bL)
(13),(37),(39)
=2 E [t]ˆ v(ˆ e) − ∆˜ w(ˆ e)+E [t|ˆ s]v(e) − 2wL − c(e)
subject to the limited-liability constraints (23), the incentive compatibility
constraints (37) and (39), the participation constraint for the second hierar-









∆˜ w(ˆ e) − ˆ c(ˆ e) ≥ 0.
Moreover, the ﬁrm has to note that E [t|ˆ s] depends on the workers’ equilib-














(ˆ p(ˆ e, ˆ e;t0)t0 +( 1− ˆ p(ˆ e,ˆ e;t0))t1)
= E [t]+




with ∆t := t1 − t0. Thus, the posterior expectation is larger than the prior
one because the more talented worker is promoted with higher probability in
case of an asymmetric pairing in the tournament. Furthermore, the posterior












(ˆ p1 (ˆ e,ˆ e;t1) − ˆ p1 (ˆ e, ˆ e;t0))
(32)
> 0. (41)
A p p l y i n gt h es a m et w o - s t e pp r o c e d u r ea si nt h eb a s i cm o d e ly i e l d st h a tt h e









{2E [t]ˆ v(ˆ e)+E [t|ˆ s]v(e) − ∆˜ w(ˆ e) − c(e)} (42)
subject to ∆˜ w(ˆ e) − r(e) ≥ 0. (43)
When comparing optimal eﬀorts under the combined contract with those
under two separate contracts, we have to distinguish whether the restriction
(43) is binding or not at the optimum. In case of a non-binding restriction,
25See the additional pages for the referees.
30optimal eﬀorts (ˆ ec
h,e c






0(ˆ e) and E [t|ˆ s]v
0 (e)=c
0 (e). (44)
Comparing the ﬁr s te q u a t i o nw i t h( 3 5 )c l e a r l ys h o w st h a tˆ ec
h > ˆ es
h as ∂E[t|ˆ s]/
∂ˆ e>0. The comparison of the second equation with (36) points out that
ec
h >e s
h, due to Lemma 1 and the fact that E [t|ˆ s] >E[t].F i n a l l y ,w eh a v e
to consider the case of a binding restriction (43). Using this restriction, we
can express level 2 eﬀort as a function of level 1 eﬀort, e(ˆ e),w i t h∂e
∂ˆ e =
∆ ˜ w0(ˆ e)
r0(e) > 0.N o w , t h e ﬁrm’s objective function under a combined contract
can be rewritten as
2E [t]ˆ v(ˆ e)+E [t|ˆ s]v(e(ˆ e)) − ∆˜ w(ˆ e) − c(e(ˆ e)).






0(ˆ e)+[E [t|ˆ s]v















Since the ﬁrst two expressions as well as r0 (e(ˆ e)) and ∆˜ w0(ˆ e) are positive,
we must have that the numerator of the last expression is negative. As
this numerator is a strictly concave function of e(ˆ e) and since E [t|ˆ s] >
E [t], we obtain from the comparison with (36) that ec
h >e s
h. Finally, we
have to consider optimal eﬀort implementation on hierarchy level 1. Since
(43) is binding, the eﬀort ˆ e that would maximize level 1 proﬁt corresponds
to a level 2 eﬀo r tt h a ti sb e l o wt h ee ﬀort e that maximizes level 2 proﬁt
E [t|ˆ s]v(e)−c(e). Hence, the ﬁrm may be interested in further raising ˆ e.A s
both proﬁt functions are strictly concave, we can apply the same argument
as in the proof of Proposition 3: the ﬁrm would, thus, never implement a
smaller ˆ e than the optimal eﬀort under a non-binding restriction. Since that
31eﬀort was larger than the optimal level 1 eﬀort under separate contracts, we
have proved that ˆ ec
h > ˆ es
h also holds under a binding restriction.
Proposition 5 Irrespective of whether restriction (43) is binding or not at
the optimum, we have ˆ ec




Proposition (5) points out that under a combined contract the ﬁrm im-
plements strictly larger eﬀorts on hierarchy level 1 than under separate con-
tracts. This result sharply contrasts with our ﬁndings in Proposition (3) on
homogeneous workers. The intuition comes from the fact that in case of het-
erogeneous workers the ﬁrm has an additional motive of implementing large
eﬀorts on hierarchy level 1: the larger ˆ e the higher will be the probability
that the more talented worker is promoted to level 2 in case of a heteroge-
neous pairing, that is ˆ p1 (ˆ e, ˆ e;t1) > 0. This, in turn, increases the posterior
expected talent of the promoted worker: ∂E[t|ˆ s]/∂ˆ e>0 according to (41)
since E [t|ˆ s] monotonically increases in ˆ p(ˆ e, ˆ e;t1). In other words, if workers
are heterogeneous, then the tournament scheme has to fulﬁll two purposes
— creating incentives and achieving eﬃcient selection. By inducing higher
incentives on level 1 the ﬁrm improves better worker selection for level 2,
because both incentives and selection are strictly interlinked.
If the restriction (43) is non-binding at the optimum, again the ﬁrm will
be strictly better oﬀ by choosing a combined contract than two separate
contracts since a combined contract leads to ﬁrst-best implementation on
hierarchy level 2, i.e. ec
h =a r g m a x e {E [t|ˆ s]v(e) − c(e)}. However, there
is a crucial diﬀerence in comparison to the basic model with homogeneous
workers. Under heterogeneity, we have the additional eﬀect that combining
both hierarchy levels via a job-promotion scheme even improves on ﬁrst-best
implementation under uncertainty as E [t|ˆ s] >E[t]. By inducing large eﬀorts
ˆ e on level 1 the ﬁrm raises the posterior expected talent of the promoted
worker (i.e. ∂E[t|ˆ s]/∂ˆ e>0) which, in turn, increases the eﬃcient eﬀort
level ec
h on level 2 that maximizes E [t|ˆ s]v(e) − c(e).
Finally, we can compare the selection properties of a combined contract
with those of separate contracts and those of a job-promotion tournament
that is used without bonus scheme at the next level. The ﬁrst comparison
32shows that the probability of promoting the better worker is strictly larger
under the combined contract than under two separate contracts where the
worker for level 2 is chosen by random; technically, we have ˆ p(ˆ ec
h, ˆ ec
h;t1) >
1/2 due to ˆ p(ˆ ei,ˆ ej;t1)=1− ˆ p(ˆ ej, ˆ ei;t0) and (31). The second comparison
seems to be even more interesting since it contrasts promotion under the
combined solution to promotion within a standard job-promotion tournament
with wages attached to jobs (i.e. ﬁxed prizes). Note that the latter one is
described in our model by the solution for hierarchy level 1 under two separate
contracts. Since ˆ ec
h > ˆ es
h, we obtain the following interesting result.
Corollary 1 Combining job-promotion with incentive pay on the next hier-
archy level always improves the selection quality of a job-promotion tourna-
ment.
Proof. ˆ p(ˆ ec
h, ˆ ec
h;t1) > ˆ p(ˆ es
h, ˆ es
h;t1) since ∂
∂ˆ eˆ p(ˆ e, ˆ e;t1)=ˆ p1 (ˆ e, ˆ e;t1)+ˆ p2 (ˆ e,ˆ e;t1)
(30)
=ˆ p1 (ˆ e, ˆ e;t1) − ˆ p1 (ˆ e,ˆ e;t0)
(32)
> 0.
At the end of Section 3, we mentioned empirical puzzles that contra-
dict standard tournament theory but can be explained by combining job-
promotion tournaments with bonuses as in our model. One of these puzzles
was that wages are not attached to jobs and, therefore, to hierarchy levels.
As has been shown in this section, the selection quality of standard job-
promotion tournaments can be signiﬁcantly improved by replacing wages
that are attached to jobs by incentive pay such as a bonus scheme. Hence,
missing wages-attached-to-jobs in the empirical literature on ﬁrms’ wage poli-
cies can be nicely explained by the existence of heterogeneous workers that
requires both appropriate incentives and eﬃcient selection.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We analyzed a two-tier hierarchy where workers compete in a rank-order
tournament on level 1. On the second tier, a worker is hired from outside
or promoted from the ﬁrst tier to carry out a managerial task that leads to
an individual performance signal. Workers are protected by limited liability
33on either hierarchy level. From a theoretical perspective, combining a job-
promotion tournament on level 1 with bonus payment on level 2 generates
two possible advantages: if workers are homogeneous, rents from level 2 can
be used to create incentives on level 1. The ﬁrm may even implement ﬁrst-
best eﬀort on the second hierarchy level although the worker earns a strictly
positive rent on this level. If workers are heterogeneous, the ﬁrm additionally
beneﬁts from a complementary bonus scheme, which strictly improves the
tournament’s selection quality in ﬁnding out the most talented worker.
Probably, the combination of tournament and bonus scheme may lead
to further advantages if workers are heterogeneous. For example, Münster
(2007) shows that more able workers may be deterred from participating in a
tournament in case of sabotage among the contestants. Then, the advantage
of higher talent is completely erased since more able workers are sabotaged
more heavily than less able ones, thus equalizing the winning probabilities of
the heterogeneous workers. If a tournament is combined with a bonus scheme
at the next level and more able workers earn higher rents at this level, the
problem of adverse participation may be mitigated.
In a diﬀerent setting, the combination of tournament and bonus scheme
may be useful to make the competition between heterogeneous contestants
more even. As is known in the tournament literature, the more uneven the
competition the less eﬀort will be chosen in equilibrium. Imagine that talent
and eﬀort are substitutes on each hierarchy level and not complements as in
our paper. Then workers’ rents on the second hierarchy level may be decreas-
ing in ability. In this situation, adding a bonus scheme to the tournament
would have the direct consequence that the uneven competition between het-
erogeneous workers on level 1 becomes less uneven as more able workers have
lower expected rents from winning the tournament than less able ones. If the
ﬁrm cannot rely on handicaps (e.g., due to only ordinal information) to coun-
terbalance ability diﬀerences, such decreasing rents would be an appropriate
instrument for regulating competition.
347A p p e n d i x
7.1 Proof of Proposition 2
We can solve problem (21)-(23) in two steps: First,w ed e r i v et h eﬁrm’s
minimum cost for inducing a given pair of eﬀort levels (ˆ e,e). Then,w e
use the optimal cost function to solve the proﬁt maximization problem and
determine the optimal eﬀort pair (ˆ ec,e c). The cost minimization problem for
ag i v e ne ﬀort pair (ˆ e,e) reads as
min
wL,wH,bL,bH
2wL +( wH − wL)+bL + p(e)(bH − bL)
subject to (8), (9), (19), (20), wL,w H,b L,b H ≥ 0.
By the incentive compatibility constraint (8), bH − bL =
c0(e)
p0(e). Thus, in com-
bination with the incentive compatibility constraint (19), we obtain
wH − wL =
ˆ c0 (ˆ e)
ˆ p1 (ˆ e, ˆ e)
− bL − p(e)
c0 (e)
p0 (e)
+ c(e)=∆w(ˆ e) − bL − r(e), (45)
where ∆w(ˆ e) is given by (4) and r(e) by (13).26




∆w(ˆ e) − ˆ c(ˆ e) ≥ 0. (46)




− c(e)=bL + r(e) ≥ 0. (47)
Thus, substituting for the tournament prize spread wH − wL and the bonus
26Recall that ∆w(ˆ e) is the prize spread necessary to induce ˆ e under separate contracts.
However, note that ∆w(ˆ e) will usually be diﬀerent from wc
H − wc
L.
35spread bH − bL, the cost minimization problem can be simpliﬁed to27
min
wL,bL
2wL + ∆w(ˆ e)+c(e) subject to (46), (47) and
∆w(ˆ e) − bL − r(e)+wL,w L,b L ≥ 0. (48)
By Lemma 1, we obtain bc
L =0for the optimal low bonus: this satisﬁes the
participation constraint for the second hierarchy level (47) and is also best
for ensuring that wH = ∆w(ˆ e) − bL − r(e)+wL ≥ 0. Hence, we can skip
constraint (47) and obtain
min
wL
2wL + ∆w(ˆ e)+c(e) subject to (46) and
∆w(ˆ e) − r(e)+wL,w L ≥ 0.
Hence, the cost-minimizing wL is given by
wL =m a x
½
0, ˆ c(ˆ e) −
1
2
∆w(ˆ e),r (e) − ∆w(ˆ e)
¾
.
From (7), we know that 1
2∆w(ˆ e) − ˆ c(ˆ e) ≥ 0. Hence,
wL =m a x{0,r (e) − ∆w(ˆ e)}.
We now have to distinguish two cases. The ﬁr s tc a s ei s
wH − wL = ∆w(ˆ e) − r(e) ≥ 0.
Then, wL =0and wH = ∆w(ˆ e) − r(e). In the second case,
wH − wL = ∆w(ˆ e) − r(e) < 0.
Hence, wL = r(e)−∆w(ˆ e) and wH =0 .I nt h eﬁrst case, the ﬁrm’s expected
labor costs are
2wL + ∆w(ˆ e)+c(e)=∆w(ˆ e)+c(e),
27Note that the optimal high bonus, bH =
c
0(e)
p0(e) + bL, is non-negative due to bL ≥ 0.
36and in the second scenario the ﬁrm’s costs amount to
2wL + ∆w(ˆ e)+c(e)=2 r(e) − ∆w(ˆ e)+c(e).
We can now turn to the second step of the solution procedure, the solution





2ˆ v(ˆ e)+v(e) − ∆w(ˆ e) − c(e) if ∆w(ˆ e) − r(e) ≥ 0
2ˆ v(ˆ e)+v(e) − [2r(e) − ∆w(ˆ e)+c(e)] otherwise.
We can see that in case 2 (i.e., the second line of the maximization problem)
the ﬁrm’s objective function is monotonically increasing in ˆ e. Hence, for each
e, the ﬁrm chooses the maximum possible ˆ e, which makes the given restriction
just binding, i.e., ∆w(ˆ e)=r(e). This implies that case 2 becomes a special
case of case 1. Thus, the ﬁrm never wants to induce eﬀort levels (ˆ e,e) such
that ∆w(ˆ e) <r (e). Doing so would imply that 0=wc
H <w c
L. Intuitively,
this means that, by implementing an adverse relative performance scheme,
the ﬁrm pays for reducing ﬁrst-level incentives that stem from the second-
level rent r(e). Such a contract cannot be optimal. The ﬁrm would be better
oﬀ by setting 0=wc
H = wc
L, thereby increasing ﬁrst-level eﬀort and reducing
workers’ ﬁrst-period rents.
Hence, we are always in the ﬁrst case. Consequently, wc
L =0and the
results of the proposition follow.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 3
(i) ˆ ec =ˆ es immediately follows from examining the objective functions (14)
and (24). ec >e s follows from r0(e) > 0, which we have proven in Lemma 1,
and r00(e) > 0, which follows from our regularity assumptions and is straight-
forward to check.28
It remains to prove result (ii). Due to the binding restriction, we can
28See the additional pages for the referees.







Moreover, the ﬁrm’s objective function (24) becomes
2ˆ v(ˆ e)+v(e(ˆ e)) − ∆w(ˆ e) − c(e(ˆ e)).
The respective ﬁrst-order condition is
2ˆ v
0(ˆ e) − ∆w
0(ˆ e)+[ v





Hence, compared to the case where the restriction is non-binding, we either
have higher eﬀo r ta th i e r a r c h yl e v e l1a n dl o w e re ﬀort at level 2, or vice versa.
Inserting ∂e/∂ˆ e in (49) yields
2ˆ v
0(ˆ e)+




Recall that ∆w0(ˆ e) > 0 and r0(e) > 0.T h eo p t i m a le ﬀort, ec, must therefore
satisfy v0 (ec)−c0(ec)−r0(ec) < 0. Under separate contracts, we have v0 (es)−
c0(es)−r0(es)=0 . Thus, since v(e)−c(e)−r(e) is strictly concave, it follows
that ec >e s.
Now consider the eﬀort choice on hierarchy level 1 under a binding restric-
tion (25). Suppose that the ﬁr mw a n t st oi m p l e m e n tt h es a m ee ﬀort level as
under a non-binding restriction, i.e., ˆ es =a r gm a x ˆ e 2ˆ v(ˆ e)−∆w(ˆ e). However,
since (25) is binding in this situation, the corresponding level 2 eﬀort is below
the optimal one, eFB. Of course, the ﬁrm can raise e to increase v(e)−c(e),
but then it has to increase ˆ e as well because of ∂e/∂ˆ e>0. Whether such an
adjustment is beneﬁcial to the ﬁrm or not depends on the functional forms.
In any case, since both functions 2ˆ v(ˆ e)−∆w(ˆ e) and v(e)−c(e) are strictly
concave, the ﬁrm will never raise e above eFB.T h i si sb e c a u s e ,i fe>e FB
and ˆ e>ˆ es,t h eﬁrm can increase proﬁts by decreasing both eﬀort levels,
while keeping (25) binding. This proves ec <e FB.
38Since ec <e FB implies v0 (ec) − c0 (ec) > 0, from (49) we obtain that
the corresponding optimal eﬀort on hierarchy level 1 must satisfy 2ˆ v0(ˆ e) −
∆w0(ˆ e) < 0. Thus, this eﬀo r tm u s tb el a r g e rt h a nt h eo p t i m a ll e v e l1e ﬀort
under a non-binding restriction (25). Since that eﬀort was identical with the
optimal level 1 eﬀort under separate contracts, ˆ es,w eh a v eˆ ec > ˆ es under the
binding restriction.
Finally, the last inequality of result (ii) directly follows from a comparison
of the ﬁrm’s overall net proﬁts under the two contractual forms. Note that,
under a combined contract with binding restriction (25), expected labor costs
are ∆w(ˆ ec)+c(ec)
(25)
= r(ec)+c(ec). We obtain overall net proﬁts under
separate contracts by summing up (15) and (14).
7.3 Proof of Proposition 4
The solution procedure is analogous to the one in Proposition 2. First, we
consider the ﬁrm’s problem of minimizing implementation costs for a given




wL + wH + α[bL + p(e)(bH − bL)]
subject to (8), (9), (27), (28), (23).
By the incentive compatibility constraint (8), bH − bL =
c0(e)
p0(e).T h u s , i n
combination with the incentive compatibility constraint (27), we obtain
wH − wL =
ˆ c0 (ˆ e)








= ∆w(ˆ e) − α[bL + r(e)],
(50)
where r(e) is given by (13) and ∆w(ˆ e) by (4).




∆w(ˆ e) − ˆ c(ˆ e) ≥ 0. (51)




− c(e)=bL + r(e) ≥ 0. (52)
Thus, substituting for the tournament prize spread wH − wL and the bonus
spread bH − bL, the cost minimization problem can be simpliﬁed to29
min
α∈[0,1],wL,bL
2wL + ∆w(ˆ e)+αc(e) subject to (51), (52) and
∆w(ˆ e) − α[bL + r(e)] + wL,w L,b L ≥ 0.
By Lemma 1, we obtain br
L =0for the optimal low bonus: this satisﬁes the
participation constraint for the second hierarchy level (52) and is also best
for ensuring that wH = ∆w(ˆ e)−α[bL + r(e)] +wL ≥ 0. Hence, we can skip
constraint (52) and obtain
min
α∈[0,1],wL
2wL + ∆w(ˆ e)+αc(e) subject to (51) and
∆w(ˆ e) − αr(e)+wL,w L ≥ 0.
The cost-minimizing wL is thus given by
wL =m a x
½
0, ˆ c(ˆ e) −
1
2
∆w(ˆ e),α r (e) − ∆w(ˆ e)
¾
.
From (7), we know that 1
2∆w(ˆ e) − ˆ c(ˆ e) ≥ 0. Hence,
wL =m a x{0,α r (e) − ∆w(ˆ e)}.
We now have to distinguish two cases. The ﬁr s tc a s ei s
wH − wL = ∆w(ˆ e) − αr(e) ≥ 0.
29Note that the optimal high bonus, bH =
c0(e)
p0(e) + bL, is non-negative due to bL ≥ 0.
40Then, wL =0and wH = ∆w(ˆ e) − αr(e). In the second case,
wH − wL = ∆w(ˆ e) − αr(e) < 0.
Hence, wL = αr(e)−∆w(ˆ e) and wH =0 .I nt h eﬁrst case, the ﬁrm’s expected
labor costs are
2wL + ∆w(ˆ e)+αc(e)=∆w(ˆ e)+αc(e),
and in the second scenario the ﬁrm’s costs amount to
2wL + ∆w(ˆ e)+αc(e)=2 αr(e) − ∆w(ˆ e)+αc(e).
We can now turn to the second step of the solution procedure, the so-
lution of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem. The optimal combination




2ˆ v(ˆ e)+αv(e) − ∆w(ˆ e) − αc(e)+( 1− α)E if ∆w(ˆ e) − αr(e) ≥ 0
2ˆ v(ˆ e)+αv(e) − [2αr(e) − ∆w(ˆ e)+αc(e)] + (1 − α)E otherwise.
With the same argumentation as in the proof of Proposition 2, it follows that
the ﬁrm will never implement eﬀort levels (ˆ e,e) such that ∆w(ˆ e)−αr(e) < 0.
Thus, wr
L =0and the ﬁrm’s optimization problem is
max
α∈[0,1],e,ˆ e
2ˆ v(ˆ e)−∆w(ˆ e)+α[v(e)−c(e)−E]+E s.t. ∆w(ˆ e)−αr(e) ≥ 0. (53)
First, assume that the restriction is not binding at the optimal solution.
Then, we have ˆ er =ˆ es, er = eFB.S i n c ev(eFB) − c(eFB) − E>0,i tf o l l o w s
that αr =1 . Hence, this case occurs if and only if ∆w(ˆ es) ≥ r(eFB),a n d
the solution is then identical to the optimal combined contract speciﬁed in
Proposition 2.
For the remainder of this proof, assume the constraint is binding at the
optimal solution, i.e. α =
∆w(ˆ e)
r(e) .W e ﬁrst show that αr > 0,w h i c hi s
41equivalent to ∆w(ˆ e) > 0 or ˆ e>0. To do so, we simplify problem (53) to
max
e,ˆ e
2ˆ v(ˆ e) − ∆w(ˆ e)+
∆w(ˆ e)
r(e)






2ˆ v(ˆ e) − ∆w(ˆ e)+
∆w(ˆ e)
r(e)
[v(e) − c(e) − E]+E s.t. ∆w(ˆ e) − r(e) ≤ 0.
(54)
If the restriction in (54) is binding, then αr =1and we are back to the
case of combined contracts without external recruitment. Now assume that
the restriction in (54) is not binding. The ﬁrst derivative of the objective
function with respect to ˆ e is
2ˆ v








Thus, at ˆ e =0 ,b e c a u s e∆w0 (0) = 0, the objective function is increasing in
ˆ e. Furthermore, since the restriction is not binding, it is feasible to increase




Now consider the case αr < 1. By the constraint in (54), we then have
∆w(ˆ er) <r (er).W en o wd e r i v eas u ﬃcient condition for αr < 1.T od os o ,
consider again problem (53). Due to the binding constraint ∆w(ˆ e)=αr(e)
we can rewrite the ﬁrm’s objective function as
2ˆ v(ˆ e) − αr(e)+α[v(e) − c(e) − E]+E
=2 ˆ v(ˆ e)+α[v(e) − c(e) − r(e) − E]+E
=2 ˆ v(ˆ e) − α[V (e
s) − V (e)] + V (e
s)
with V (·): =v(·) − c(·) − r(·) being strictly concave with maximum at es.








42Problem (53) can then be restated as
max
α∈[0,1],ˆ e
2ˆ v(ˆ e) − α[V (e
s) − V (e(α))] + V (e
s).
We will have an interior solution αr < 1 if and only if marginally decreasing
α at α =1raises ﬁrm’s proﬁts, that is
∂
∂α
[2ˆ v(ˆ e) − α[V (e
s) − V (e(α))] + V (e
s)]
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
α=1
< 0.
Using that α =1corresponds to the solution under a combined contract
(ˆ e =ˆ ec, e = ec), we obtain30
∂
∂α
[2ˆ v(ˆ e) − α[V (e
s) − V (e(α))] + V (e
s)]
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
α=1
= −[V (e






¸¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
α=1
= −[V (e

















Hence, we will have an interior solution αr < 1 if
V (e







Since es maximizes V (e),i th o l d st h a tV (es) >V(ec). However, due to
ec >e s,w ea l s oh a v eV 0 (ec) < 0. Thus, whether (55) is satisﬁed or not











We now show that αr < 1 may indeed incur. This is the case if the
constraint (54) is non-binding at the optimal eﬀorts (er, ˆ er). First note that
30Using ˆ e as a function of α yields the same condition.
43er is then independent of ˆ er and given by
e
r =a r gm a x
e







r =a r gm a x
e 2ˆ v(ˆ e) − (1 − M)∆w(ˆ e).
Assume that M<1, i.e., we have an interior solution with ˆ er > 0.F o r
example, consider ˆ v(ˆ e)=aˆ e, a>0, ˆ c(ˆ e)=ˆ e2/2 and ˆ p(ˆ eA,ˆ eB)=
ˆ eA
ˆ eA+ˆ eB.T h e
parameter a does not appear in any other function. Then, we obtain
ˆ e
r =a r gm a x










We then have αr < 1 if ∆w(ˆ er)= a2
4(1−M)2 <r (er).S i n c e M and r(er) are
independent of a,t h i si n e q u a l i t yi ss a t i s ﬁed if a is suﬃciently small.













As a result, since we must have α ≤ 1 and α =1corresponds to the combined
contract (with a binding constraint (25)), we have er ≥ ec and ˆ er ≤ ˆ ec.I t
remains to show that ˆ es < ˆ er and er <e FB.T od os o ,w ed e n o t eb yµ the
Lagrange multiplier for the constraint in (53) and assume that the constraint
is binding, i.e., µ>0. Then, the ﬁrst-order conditions w.r.t. ˆ e and e are
2ˆ v
0(ˆ e









r)] = 0. (57)
Since µ>0, we obtain from the second condition that er <e FB. Combining
44both equations yields
µ =






Hence, it must hold that 2ˆ v0(ˆ er) − ∆w0 (ˆ er) < 0 and, therefore, ˆ er > ˆ es.
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478 Appendix for Referees
8.1 Separate Contracts with Homogeneous Workers
Second-order condition for the ﬁrm’s objective function on the ﬁrst hierarchy






ˆ c00ˆ p1 −
∂ˆ p1










ˆ c000ˆ p1 −
∂ˆ p1




∂ˆ e2 ˆ c0 +
∂ˆ p1
∂ˆ e ˆ c00
i




∂ˆ e ˆ c0
[ˆ p1]4 > 0
The last inequality follows since ˆ c000 ≥ 0,
∂ˆ p1
∂ˆ e < 0,
∂2ˆ p1
∂ˆ e2 ≤ 0.
Second-order condition for the ﬁrm’s objective function on the second
















[p000c0 + p00c00][p0]2 − 2p0p00p00c0
[p0]4 > 0.
The last inequality follows since c000 ≥ 0, p00 < 0, p000 ≤ 0.
8.2 Combined Contract with Heterogeneous Workers
Step 1: Minimizing costs
Since bH ≥ 0 is ensured by the incentive constraint for hierarchy level 2 in




∆˜ w(ˆ e)+2 wL + c(e)




∆˜ w(ˆ e) − ˆ c(ˆ e) ≥ 0
wH − wL + bL + r(e)=∆˜ w(ˆ e)




∆˜ w(ˆ e)+2 wL + c(e)




∆˜ w(ˆ e) − ˆ c(ˆ e) ≥ 0
∆˜ w(ˆ e) − bL − r(e)+wL,w L,b L ≥ 0.
From Lemma 1 we know that r(e) ≥ 0 so that bc
L =0and the minimization
problem further reduces to
min
wL




∆˜ w(ˆ e) − ˆ c(ˆ e) ≥ 0
∆˜ w(ˆ e) − r(e)+wL,w L ≥ 0.
Hence,
wL =m a x
½
0, ˆ c(ˆ e) −
1
2
∆˜ w(ˆ e),r (e) − ∆˜ w(ˆ e)
¾
.
We know that 1
2∆˜ w(ˆ e)− ˆ c(ˆ e) ≥ 0; otherwise, ˆ e would not be an equilibrium
strategy. Thus,
wL =m a x{0,r (e) − ∆˜ w(ˆ e)}.
49We have to distinguish two cases. First, wH−wL = ∆˜ w(ˆ e)−r(e) ≥ 0. Then,
wL =0 and wH = ∆˜ w(ˆ e) − r(e).
Second, wH − wL = ∆˜ w(ˆ e) − r(e) < 0. Then,
wL = r(e) − ∆˜ w(ˆ e) and wH =0 .
In the ﬁrst case, the ﬁrm’s expected labor costs are
∆˜ w(ˆ e)+2 wL + c(e)=∆˜ w(ˆ e)+c(e)
and in the second they amount to
∆˜ w(ˆ e)+2 wL + c(e)=2 r(e) − ∆˜ w(ˆ e)+c(e).
Step 2: Maximizing expected proﬁts




2E [t]ˆ v(ˆ e)+E [t|ˆ s]v(e) − ∆˜ w(ˆ e) − c(e) if ∆˜ w(ˆ e) − r(e) ≥ 0
2E [t]ˆ v(ˆ e)+E [t|ˆ s]v(e) − 2r(e)+∆˜ w(ˆ e) − c(e) otherwise.
In analogy to the basic model, again the ﬁrm’s objective function in the
second line is monotonically increasing in ˆ e (recall that ∂E[t|ˆ s]/∂ˆ e>0
according to (41)). Hence, for each e the ﬁrm chooses the maximum possible
ˆ e that makes the given restriction just bind so that the second line becomes a
special case of the problem in line 1. The ﬁrm chooses wc
L =0and implements









{2E [t]ˆ v(ˆ e)+E [t|ˆ s]v(e) − ∆˜ w(ˆ e) − c(e)}
subject to ∆˜ w(ˆ e) − r(e) ≥ 0.
50